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Author's Note: This essay is based on fieldwork conducted in Bujung between October 1997 
and August 1998, later followed by a shorter visit in July and August 1999. The research 
area can be roughly divided into a wealthier upper section and a relatively poor lower section. 
During most o f the term of my fieldwork I lived in the upper section of the ward, where 1 
rented a house ivith a former head of the neighborhood. I tried to participate in daily life as 
much as possible, so that I was able to observe daily activities and social interaction, engage in 
informal conversations with a wide variety o f people, and eavesdrop on all kinds o f gossip. In 
the meantime, I conducted a large number o f more or less structured interviews with both 
women and men. To gather more quantitative data, I organized a structured questionnaire 
distributed among 156 households, while at the same time I found ten women prepared to fill 
in booklets with daily income and expenditures for two separate months.
The issues examined in this paper were not easy to investigate. I believe that there is 
hardly any society where people will easily discuss their financial problems and strategies 
openly with relative strangers, but in Javanese society there is a particularly strong taboo 
against open discussion or acknowledgment of debts. As an example: although every day a 
number of moneylenders traversed the ward, hardly anybody was willing to admit that he or 
she borrowed money from them, but at the same time many people were quickly willing to say
1 1 am grateful to Frans Hiisken and Gerben Nooteboom for the helpful comments I received from them while 
writing this article. This research is sponsored by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences 
(KNAW).
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that all their neighbors did. The fact that people were willing to gossip about the loans of 
others, but not willing to discuss their own loans in earnest, presented a big problem, 
something which could only be solved by close and frequent observation and by gaining the 
confidence of a small number of key informants.
Another initial problem was the fact that it was not a simple matter for me, as a male 
researcher, to interview women. In the first months, I was usually more or less forced to 
conduct interviews with the husband, with his wife as a silent witness. He would normally 
answer the questions, often incorrectly, even though they clearly related to the competency of 
his wife. Only after I had completed about half of my fieldwork did it become possible to 
interview women on their own, although this was clearly less problematic in the lower section 
than in the upper section of the ward. It was easier to approach the women living in Bujung's 
lower section, where they spent more time outside the house because their kitchens were too 
small for simultaneous cooking and laundering. What's more, their lower status within the 
community perhaps allowed them to bypass or ignore general rules o f conduct more often.2
On a sunny afternoon in July, I meet Parman in a foodstall on the main road close 
to his home. Parman is a coolie whom I have come to know very well. He has just 
gotten a ride with a truck that had come to Yogyakarta to deliver building material 
and needed help unloading, a job that earned him Rp4,500. Now he is tired and 
hungry. Parman orders a large plate of rice and vegetables, together with tea and 
some snacks, and after the meal he buys a cigarette. For this food and for the 
breakfast, which he had taken in the morning, he has to pay Rp4,000.
Then I offer Parman a ride to his house, and so we leave. At his house, his wife is 
waiting, he tells about his job and orders her to fix a cup of tea for the guest. She 
prepares the drink and asks her husband for the money he earned. Parman throws 
a wrinkled Rp500 note down in front of her. Her face turns gray and she grimaces. 
For a moment it is unclear whether she wants to rail at him or cry. In the end she 
just mumbles: "Is that all!?"
This incident may appear to feature a defenseless housewife waiting at home for 
what money her husband is willing to give her. In fact, Parman's wife is not so passive 
or entirely defenseless as that image suggests. She holds two jobs herself, working in 
the morning and the evening, but that income is not enough to support her family. She 
therefore remains dependent on the highly uncertain income of her husband. This is just 
one of many examples I encountered illustrating the tensions that exist between 
husbands and wives in Bujung, the ward where I conducted my fieldwork. Judging 
from my observations, a large percentage of the conflicts between spouses is related to 
money issues.
The incident involving Parman and his wife relates directly to an ongoing debate 
between social anthropologists working in Southeast Asia, a debate which focuses on 
the position of women in the household, her status, power, and room for maneuvering
2 See also Ward Keeler, "Speaking of Gender in Java," in Power and Difference: Gender in Island Southeast 
Asia, ed. Jane M. Atkinson and Shelly Errington (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
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vis-a-vis her husband. In this debate, many scholars have accepted the notion that 
women in Southeast Asia enjoy particularly strong decision-making power within the 
household. It is often noted that Javanese women have no cultural restrictions on their 
mobility in the sense that they are free to venture out of the house independently, and 
so they have ample opportunities to work and earn an income. These factors, it is 
assumed, ensure that Javanese women wield most, or all, of the decision-making power 
over the household budget.3
Other scholars have challenged some of these assumptions and offered more 
balanced assessments of women's roles in Southeast Asia. Hildred Geertz, for 
example, observes that differences exist between one household and the other, though 
she goes on to argue that the balance of power usually favors the wife: "household 
management ranges from dominance by the wife to a point of almost complete 
equality."4 Ward Keeler also makes clear that the decision-making power of women is 
sometimes restricted, especially when it comes to large expenditures.5 Hanna Papanek 
and Laurel K. Schwede present relevant quantitative figures from urban Jakarta. Their 
data confirm the traditional opinion, showing that in two out of three households the 
wife is dominant with regard to financial decision-making; in one in five households, 
decisions are reached jointly; and in only one in twenty households is the husband 
dominant.6 Wolf, however, criticizes these research findings and argues that answers 
to any question about the roles of women can be considerably different if the question 
is asked in a more direct and less abstract way.7 In that case it becomes clear, 
according to Wolf, that contrary to the general norm, the husbands are the ones who 
most often decide on expenditures. Wolf also emphasizes that a strong economic 
position is not consistently accompanied by equally strong cultural prestige; Keeler 
makes a similar argument.8 Handling money, taking loans, and negotiating small money 
exchanges at the market are not highly valued activities in the Javanese cultural 
context. Therefore, when women in Java are given space as economic actors, this, in 
fact, signifies an inferior social position.9 Some of the controversies in this debate can 
be accommodated and issues clarified by taking into account the distinction between 
the interrelated concepts of "female autonomy" and "social power," as Ann Stoler has
3 See Robert R. Jay, Javanese Villagers: Social Relations in Rural Modjokuto (Cambridge, MA: MTT Press, 
1969), pp. 92-3; and Lenore Manderson, 'Introduction/' in Womens Work and Roles: Economics and 
Everyday Life in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, ed. L. Manderson (Australian National University 
Development Studies Center, 1983), p. 6.
4 Hildred Geertz, The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization (Glencoe: Free Press, 1961), p. 
125.
5 Keeler, "Speaking of Gender in Java," p. 129.
6 Hanna Papanek and Laurel K. Schwede, "Women Are Good With Money: Earning and Managing in an 
Indonesian City," in A Home Divided: Women and Income in the Third World, ed. Daisy Dwyer and Judith 
Bruce (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 89-91.
7 Diane L. Wolf, Factory Daughters: Gender, Household Dynamics, and Rural Industrialization in Java 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 65.
8 Keeler, "Speaking of Gender in Java," p. 128.
9 Wolf, Factory Daughters, p. 66. Suzanne A. Brenner in The Domestication of Desire: Women, Wealth, and 
Modernity in Java (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 134-70, argues against this, saying that 
women's involvement in the worldly affairs of money is, in another sense, viewed as a crucially important 
role, which mediates between acquiring essential resources and upholding the pride of the family.
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proposed. According to Stoler, "female autonomy" refers to "the extent to which 
women exercise economic control over their own lives vis-^-vis men (e.g., in disposing 
of the fruits of their labour)" and "social power" refers to the "extent in which women 
exercise control over the lives of others outside the domestic sphere."10 This paper 
concentrates on the financial autonomy of Bujung women, meaning the ability of 
women to spend money according to their own wishes and insights.
In this paper, I would like to connect the ongoing discussion about the position of 
women in Indonesia with another discussion, one on credit and microfinance as policy 
interventions. In the latter sphere, it has often been observed that women have less 
access to credit than men do, especially when it comes to "formal" sources of credit, 
such as banks and governmental credit programs. These institutions tend to look for 
customers only among men, and they require collateral that is often in the hands of 
men. Among those who have recognized this problem, many have advocated credit 
programs specially targeted at women, usually with women's "empowerment" as a 
final objective. Advocates believe that access to credit increase women's independence 
and improve their position within and outside the household.11 Critics of such policies 
have argued, however, that the idea that credit can create "empowerment" is overly 
simplistic, and that in many cases the provision of credit (or debt) is worsening the 
position of women rather than improving it.12 The purpose of this paper is to 
determine whether access to credit has a positive influence on female financial 
autonomy. The paper focuses on understanding the various ways in which Bujung 
households operate and how the positions of women differ from one social category to 
another in order to discover what access to credit means for female autonomy.13
Bujung, the Research Area
Bujung is a ward at the outskirts of the city of Yogyakarta with approximately six 
thousand inhabitants. The central part of the ward is dominated by the well-cared-for 
houses of local businessmen, civil servants, and teachers, sharply segregated from the 
poorer dwellings of laborers and pedicab drivers. The houses of the poorer residents 
are concentrated on lower ground, on the slopes of the two small rivers that border the 
ward. The ward is the home of a somewhat fragmented, but close-knit, community 
where contacts between neighbors are strong and voluntary working projects and 
funerals are well attended. The inhabitants of Bujung can be divided roughly into three
10 Ann Stoler, "Class Structure and Female Autonomy in Rural Java," Signs 3 (1977): 74-89, esp. 74.
11 See for instance Syed M. Hashemi et al. "Rural Credit Programs and Women's Empowerment in 
Bangladesh," World Development 24,4 (1996): 635-53.
12 Aminur Rahman, "Micro-Credit Initiatives for Equitable and Sustainable Development: Who Pays?," 
World Development, 27,1 (1999): 67-82; Linda Mayoux, "Microfinance and Women's Empowerment 
Issues," Devfinance (September 15,1999), available by E-mail: devfinance@lists.acs.ohio-state.edu; Dale W. 
Adams, "Inflated Expectations," Devfinance (September 27,1999), available E-mail: 
devfinance@lists.acs.ohio-state.edu.
13 In the case of Bujung, it is very appropriate to follow the second proposition of Stoler that the question of 
class relations is analytically prior to the investigation of male-female relationships within classes. See 
Stoler, "Class Structure and Female Autonomy," p. 75.
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different categories: two categories of people with relatively stable incomes and one 
category of people with relatively unstable incomes.
The first category is made up of the descendants of original families who continue 
to own large portions of land in the ward. They have sold a large part of what they 
used to own, but they still derive a significant amount of income from renting houses 
and rooms to others. Most of them have a junior high school education, and they often 
run small enterprises or work in the lower ranks of the civil service. The second 
category includes the richer families of immigrants with office jobs. They usually have a 
senior high school education or even a university education. Most of them arrived in 
Bujung shortly after 1965, and they have built houses of good quality on land which 
they bought from the original inhabitants.14 People in these first two categories live in 
the section of the ward located on higher ground, and they enjoy strong social 
interactions with each other. In terms of income, their situations are similar. Most of 
these households depend in large part on the monthly salary of one or more office 
workers or on the revenues of a well-established enterprise. Although these incomes are 
too modest to allow them to attain the coveted lifestyle of the upper middle-class— 
complete with the car, mobile phone, and satellite dish—the important thing is that 
they are fairly stable. To supplement this stable basic income, individuals in these 
families often have access to all kinds of part-time jobs that provide larger or smaller 
irregular incomes.
The third category is that of the poor migrants living on the slopes of the rivers. 
Most of these residents came to Bujung in the 1970s from the dry agricultural district 
of Gunung Kidul, Yogyakarta Province. Few of them have more than an elementary 
school education. The financial situation of the lower class households in Bujung is 
significantly different from the situation of the upper class households. They depend 
heavily on daily incomes, which are intermittent and insecure; earnings from such jobs 
are cut off when a person is ill or cannot work for any other reason. Typical 
occupations for men of this class are pedicab driver, coolie, construction worker, or 
parking guard. Women earn irregular incomes as traders or by producing goods to sell 
in the home, but a large number of women in this category find regular employment as 
housemaids or laundry ladies, which earns them a very low but stable monthly income.
Balancing Income and Expenditures in Bujung Households
While acknowledging that there are many exceptions, one can say that over the 
past decade the nuclear family has become Indonesia's dominant economic household 
unit. The majority of households in Bujung consists of two parents and a few, most 
often two, children. Typical exceptions are households where elderly parents live with 
their children and grandchildren, or single mothers with one or more children. In a few 
cases other relatives or friends join the household irregularly, usually for a short
14 The year 1965 is a turning point in both national and local history. It was the year of the massive 
crackdown on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), in which hundreds of thousands were killed and 
which marked the beginning of the New Order regime. Bujung in those days was one of the centers of the 
communist party in Yogyakarta. Many local leaders were killed or imprisoned, leaving space for others to 
rise to prominence within the community.
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period.15 In the households of Bujung, occupational multiplicity is the standard. Not 
only does the household income come from various household members, but each 
person usually derives an income from various sources. This way, households 
experience a complex mix of income cycles, where part of the money may be acquired 
on a daily basis, another part on a monthly basis, and the rest occasionally and 
unpredictably. Generally, in most households, the incomes of both partners are 
substantial, relative to each other, but the husband earns more.16 However, in a large 
number of households, especially among the laborers of the lower section of the ward, 
the wife earns more than the husband.17 In cases where unmarried youngsters earn an 
income of their own, they are generally free to spend it for themselves. With a few 
exceptions, they are only asked to contribute to the family when there is a deficiency of 
household funds.
In the eyes of people in Bujung, a monthly income is most desirable. It provides 
more security and makes it easier to take care of monthly expenditures, in addition to 
making a person more eligible for credit. A monthly income is normally associated with 
civil servants and with employees of private companies, but the many housekeepers 
and laundry ladies in the ward also receive their wages once a month. The 
disadvantage of a monthly income is that one has to be very careful with spending, so 
that one does not have to pass the last days of the month with an empty wallet.18 
People who receive weekly incomes have similar problems with financial planning. 
They may also find it more difficult to deal with large expenditures. The weekly 
income is typical for laborers engaged in small enterprises, such as workshops and 
retail shops.
But most people in Bujung earn a daily income, which is more or less uncertain for 
nearly all such workers. Small food traders, home producers, pedicab drivers, 
construction workers, parking guards, taxi drivers, coolies, scavengers, and shop- 
owners, for example, all rely on daily incomes. These people have to find ways to deal 
with days when they earn a minimal income or nothing at all. It is very difficult for 
them to deal with larger expenditures.
When describing income situations in Bujung, one must pay attention to the notion 
of rezeki, a word that popped up in almost every discussion or interview I conducted
15 In the two neighborhood sections where I concentrated my fieldwork, more than half of the households 
consisted of two parents and one or more children. One in seven households consisted of two parents, one 
or more children, and one or more grandparents, and one in ten households consisted of a single mother and 
one or more children. The remaining households fell into different, smaller categories.
16 It proved to be very hard to quantify the size of the contributions of women in these households because 
there is a strong tendency among both women and men to disqualify the income earning activities of the wife 
as "just helping the husband" (bantu-bantu suami).
17 When Panut, a pedicab driver, was found guilty of adultery and banned from the neighborhood for three 
years by a popular tribunal, his wife danced and sang in front of her house. The reason for her display was 
not so much her husband's promiscuous behavior—she had been aware of that fact for several years—but 
mainly because Panut was a "pain in the neck" and cost more than he contributed to the household. A 
neighboring woman said: "He is just lying around each day, only begging for food and money for cigarettes. 
She is working hard and I really feel pity for her."
18 Wives of civil servants regularly complained that they were stressed during the final days of each month, 
and a woman who went from house to house in the mornings peddling breakfast snacks told me that her 
business was significantly diminished at the end of every month.
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on income and expenditures. The word rezeki connotes luck and is used to refer to a 
windfall, a sudden burst of income, relatively large and more or less unexpected. It is a 
special consequence of the fluctuation of incomes in Bujung. Civil servants regularly 
receive special bonuses, which they consider rezeki. Pedicab drivers may have many 
customers on one day, or a single tourist who pays exceptionally well. Coolies may 
suddenly be hired for a heavy, but well-paying, job. The group of housewives who 
annually travel to the North Javanese town of Pekalongan to wrap Idul Fitri presents 
also consider this income as rezeki. And of course winning the lottery is rezeki as well. 
People in Bujung like to use their rezeki for something special, like buying new clothes or 
a present for the grandchildren. However, many people are forced to use part of it to 
repay their debts, as a way to balance financial cycles in the household. Without 
access to rezeki, few people would dare to take on debts in order to deal with 
unexpected costs.
The predominant situation in many households, characterized by unreliable cycles 
of household income, is matched by equally irregular cycles of expenditures. This is not 
to say that life for such families is entirely chaotic; just as most households rely on 
certain reliable, basic sources of income, they also must meet certain basic 
expenditures. Most of the household budget is spent on food. Most families spend 
fairly consistent amounts of money daily on rice, vegetables, meat or soybean cake, 
snacks, and sweets.19 Other daily purchases might include soap, cigarettes, and school 
fees for primary school. During longer cycles, people are confronted with other costs. 
Each month there are the electricity and water bills, monthly fees for high school, and 
contributions to mutual associations. Each year, the rent has to be paid (if people do 
not own their house or land), the costs of Idul Fitri (the Islamic feast at the end of the 
Ramaddan) must be covered, and certain annual school fees come due. On an irregular 
basis, people are confronted with costs of illness, of family rituals—such as weddings, 
funerals, or circumcisions—with reciprocal contributions to other households, and 
housing costs. Patterns of expenditure differ from one household to another depending 
on luck, wants, and the family cycle. Obviously these costs, whether they are expected 
or not, do not always tally with income flows. When, for one reason or another, it is 
not possible or desirable to expend one's own savings or seek financial help from 
others, the only possible solution is to borrow.
Sources of Credit
Parker Shipton defines credit or loans as "any transfer of goods or services by one 
person or group to another, or to any of its members, with the expectation of 
compensation at a later time."20 For the people of Bujung, a number of loan options are 
available, each with its own advantages and disadvantages.
Bank. Only a few people borrow from the bank. The bank requires monthly 
installments, and late payment is punished with a fine. Interest is set at around 4-5
19 Civil servants and some employees with private firms receive a large bag of rice each month. The quality 
of this rice is usually bad, and most people try to sell it or mix it with better quality rice.
20 Parker Shipton, "The Rope and the Box: Group Savings in the Gambia," in Informal Finance in Low- 
Income Countries, ed. Dale W. Adams and Delbert A. Fitchett (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 27.
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percent per month. Civil servants can borrow money at low-interest rates with their 
income as collateral, but all other people need to have land as collateral, and those 
who have land often consider the risk of losing their land to be too high. The bank is 
hardly ever a source of credit that can be used by a woman on her own because the 
necessary collateral is usually held in her husband's name. In general, the bank is only 
an option for lower middle-class householders living in the upper section of the ward.
Boss. For those people who work for a boss, the boss figures as one of the most 
valued sources of credit. This loan option is open to laborers in factories and shops, 
and to housekeepers and laundry ladies. Most bosses are willing to pay wages in 
advance, and these loans can be repaid through deductions on future wages, an 
arrangement that minimizes the risk of default. No interest is charged, and in some 
cases it is possible for the debtor to renew the loan before it is fully repaid. Some 
women like to borrow from their bosses, or they may even ask the boss to deduct and 
hold a portion of their wages in reserve so that they can accumulate a larger fund of 
shopping money. Similar arrangements exist between traders and suppliers.21 Office 
workers can often borrow from an office co-operative or even from the financial 
reserves held by their department.
Relatives. Relatives are a problematic source for credit, since usually they only 
provide big loans in case of urgent needs, and even when such emergencies arise, poor 
people are still reluctant to go to richer relatives to ask for money. Quite a few stories 
circulate in Bujung describing how people who have succeeded in life make efforts to 
avoid contact with their poorer relatives. The main reason for this is probably that 
loans to kin are usually not repaid, or they are only repaid with thanks, not cash. 
According to general report, a few lenders in Bujung confronted this problem by 
demanding that their relatives deliver over the borrower's television set so that they 
could keep it, as security, until the money was paid back. In most cases, loans from 
relatives remain limited to small sums lent by siblings who live nearby. If a woman 
needs just another Rpl,000 to buy vegetables or to pay a moneylender, she will 
generally approach her sister before asking a neighbor unrelated to her. In general 
terms, the borrowing conditions that define transactions between relatives resemble 
those that characterize transactions between neighbors and friends.
Neighbors and friends. In these cases it is also very difficult to deny a person a 
favor, and in these transactions as well the borrower is very likely to default on the 
loan. The rule of thumb is that when a person want his or her money to be repaid, he or 
she must ask for it three times in advance. That way, the borrower is given some time 
to raise the necessary funds. In some cases people charge interest on loans to their 
neighbors, but this is not considered a very civil thing to do. These typically small and 
unsecured loans from relatives, neighbors, and friends are much more common in the 
lower section than in the upper section of the ward, and although men do make similar 
arrangements, it is usually women who engage in these types of loans.
21 Traders are often reluctant to ask for such loans from their suppliers, since they are concerned about the 
negative effects it might have on their business relationship. This is less of an issue when transactions 
involve laborers and their bosses, although I did come across one case where a laborer was fired because 
he was taking out too many loans.
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Moneylenders. One of the least appealing options for those who wish to take out a 
loan is the moneylender. The people in Bujung distinguish between different types of 
moneylenders. The bank plecit (chasing bank) is a moneylending company from which 
you can borrow small amounts. It is typically a small company that sends employees 
to the houses of debtors to collect the daily repayment installments. A second type of 
moneylender is the rentenir. The rentenir are often single women who live in the ward, 
give out comparatively large loans, and ask for collateral. Repayment is scheduled on a 
monthly basis. Some people with whom I spoke distinguished the lintah darat (leech) as 
a third type of moneylender, similar to the rentenir, except that the lintah darat does 
not require collateral. These three types of lenders usually charge interest at 20 percent 
per month. They usually allow a borrower to postpone repayment for some time, 
though they have been known to grow impatient, enter the debtor's house, and seize 
assets that more or less represented the value of the debt. A fourth type of lender is 
called the tukang kredit. As with the bank plecit, the tukang kredit representative goes 
from house to house. From him you can buy all kinds of things, such as plates, rice 
cookers, and bicycle tires, and pay them off in daily installments. There is no clearly 
defined interest rate charged; the interest is included in the prices of the goods.
Both women and men borrow from these moneylenders, although they mainly cater 
to women because it is more practical for them to deal with people who can be found 
at home most of the time. The women who reside in the lower section of the 
neighborhood are most likely to make use of the bank plecit; the bank plecit's daily 
repayment schedule clearly targets the households of laborers rather than those of 
office workers. The rentenir and the lintah darat cater to people in the upper area as 
well as the lower. The work of these moneylenders is comparatively secretive and 
flexible in accommodating the demands of households depending on monthly incomes.
Shops. Most luxury goods, especially motorcycles, are bought on credit, and many 
shops in Yogyakarta advertise their willingness to extend credit to customers. But more 
significant sources of credit are the small food stores, which can be found all over the 
ward. In many of these shops it is possible to buy food on credit if a person has no 
money. Shopkeepers expect such debts to be repaid when the customer does have 
money again, notably on payday. Those who delay repayment will simply never be 
allowed to borrow again. This practice is called bon zoarung, and it is only an option 
for those people who have a weekly or monthly income. Because it involves shopping, 
this is an option most commonly used by women, with the husband's wage often 
functioning as collateral. Usually women take out these loans because available 
shopping money is insufficient to meet the demands of the household. Later, the loan 
will have to be repaid with shopping money as well, an eventuality that could create 
another shortage so that it becomes necessary to buy on credit again. Women in the 
lower-income groups are most likely to become trapped in such a credit cycle.22
Pawnshops. The Indonesian government runs a network of pawnshops all over the 
country where a person can pawn valuable goods. These government shops are 
especially interested in gold, televisions, computers, and the like. The interest rate is
22 This is a good example of why the poor pay more. The need for shopping on credit forces poor 
housewives to shop in the ward instead of in the larger market, where prices are cheaper. At the same time, 
the owners of these neighborhood shops themselves are unable to charge interest or raise prices for those 
customers who want to buy on credit, so that the practice can threaten their businesses.
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set at around 3 percent per month. People who can afford to buy such luxury items 
often use them as assets which can be pawned to raise money to cover unexpected 
costs. The poor in Yogyakarta do not usually rely on official government pawnshops, 
however, unless they intend to pawn their gold. More often they go to the illegal 
pawnshops in Yogyakarta which are run by the Chinese. These shops charge a much 
higher interest rate than the government pawnshops (around 20 percent per month) 
and offer less money for the same article, but they do accept goods which the 
government pawnshops do not, such as clothes and household utensils. For this 
reason, they are more popular with the poor. If the pawnshop loan is not repaid within 
three months, the assets are sold.
Simpan pinjam. Finally there are mutual associations, the simpan pinjam, which 
provide credit. They are the Indonesian form of a type of association generally referred 
to as ASCRA (Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations). In an ASCRA, "the 
pooled savings are not instantly redistributed but kept in custody and allowed to 
accumulate by lending parts of the fund to members or outsiders for interest."23 In 
Bujung, these institutions are predominantly the domain of men. The women in Bujung 
do participate in the simpan pinjam of the Family Welfare Program (PKK)24 in their 
own respective neighborhood sections,25 but the loans offered by these associations are 
often very small and economically meaningless. In the neighborhoods of the lower 
section of Bujung, it is common practice not to pay off the installments as they come 
due, but to wait a few months, then borrow from a friend or relative in order to repay 
the whole loan at once. A new loan from the association can then be acquired, which is 
used almost entirely to repay that friend or relative. The women themselves call this 
practice "speculation," as they speculate that the loan they will be able to acquire is 
bigger than the debt they have already incurred. The small "profit" they make can then 
be used to fill small holes in their shopping budgets. Most of these credit associations 
are PKK-sponsored groups that operate with government support, though a few 
associations have been initiated by private concerns. In these associations women from 
all levels of wealth participate, and a small number of women do take out 
comparatively large loans. Most tend to borrow as much as they can, pay their 
installments, and then borrow again as soon as possible, disregarding specific financial 
needs. 26
23 Frits J. A. Bouman, "ROSCA and ASCRA: Beyond the Financial Landscape," in Financial Landscapes 
Reconstructed: The Fine Art o f Mapping Development, ed. Frits J. A. Bouman and Otto Hospes (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1994), p. 376.
24 The Family Welfare Program, or Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, is a government program in which 
each Indonesian mother is obliged to participate. In Bujung almost every woman attends the meetings in her 
own neighborhood section. A minority of the women participate in the PKK activities of the larger 
neighborhood, and only a few reach outside their own ward.
25 The whole of Indonesia is officially subdivided along a variety of administrative lines, and the smallest 
segment is the neighborhood section, or Rukun Tetangga (RT). It consists of around forty families who 
reside close to each other. Bujung is made up of sixteen neighborhood sections.
2(1 An interesting typology on the various sources of credit in Indonesia can be found in Frits J. A. Bouman 
and Henk A. J. Moll, "Informal Finance in Indonesia," in Informal Finance in Low-Income Countries, ed. Dale 
W. Adams and Delbert A. Fitchett (Boulder, CO: Wesview Press, 1992).
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Negotiating over Different Kinds of Money
Not all money is the same. Housewives tend to distinguish between different kinds 
of money on the basis of origin, destination, amount, and other similar 
considerations.27 Each housewife in Bujung has her own system for keeping track of 
cash flows in and around the household. For our analysis, it is useful to make a 
somewhat artificial distinction between three different kinds of money used for the 
household budget, defining each category according to which person is entitled to make 
decisions concerning that money.
Shopping money (uang belanja), which is used to cover the daily household 
expenses, is central to any household budget. This money is under the control of the 
wife, and only a few husbands keep a close eye on how she spends it. Apart from 
shopping money, there is pocket money (uang jajan), which individual members of the 
household can use for their own private purposes. Pocket money is available to 
husbands, children, and the elderly, while wives usually have to manage with their 
shopping money. The third category of money is stocked savings, money reserved for 
future expenditures. This money can be kept in a special jar in the house, at the bank, 
in an arisan, or in the form of durable goods. Deciding whether and when this money 
will be used is usually the joint responsibility of husband and wife. Their personalities 
largely determine which of them wields the most influence in such matters. In some 
households the money designated as shopping money may be insufficient, so that 
stocked savings or pocket money must regularly be spent to meet the pressing needs of 
the household. In other households, the shopping money may be more than sufficient, 
so that the wife is able to save part of it to meet future needs.
Even though the wife has the responsibility over the shopping money, the husband 
decides the actual quantity of funds to be earmarked as shopping money because it 
consists of the earnings of the wife plus whatever additional contribution is offered by 
the husband. Most husbands subtract a small amount from their own income before 
they give the money to their wives and use it for buying cigarettes, an occasional snack, 
and for gambling. A few "good" husbands simply give all of their income and ask for 
money every time they want to buy cigarettes. Their wives are often able to save 
relatively large amounts of shopping money, sometimes in secret jars, thereby 
expanding their own financial room to maneuver. The more common "tough" husbands 
make a conservative calculation of the shopping money their wives will need and keep 
the rest for themselves as pocket money.28 In these households, quarrels about money 
frequently erupt, and wives have to negotiate and cheat in order to meet expenses.
While men usually try to keep as much money for themselves as possible, women 
have a rather different objective in this negotiating process. Their goal is to improve 
their own ability to balance the household budget. This is what financial autonomy 
means to them. In practice, this means that they must seek funds to meet expenditures,
27 Viviana Zelizer, "The Special Meaning of Money: 'Special Monies/" American Journal o f Sociology 95,2 
(1989): 342-77 already considered the existence of different kinds of money. She describes the special status 
of household money for housewives in the United States. She argues that "culture and social structure mark 
the quality of money by institutionalizing controls, restrictions, and distinctions in the source, uses, modes 
of allocation, and even the quantity of money. " Zelizer, "The Special Meaning of Money," p. 342.
28 The qualifications "good” and "tough" (baik and keros) were used by female informants.
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and that they must identify and select appropriate expenditures when money enters 
the house. Various considerations occupy women in Bujung as they attempt to balance 
the household budget and match income to expenditure: How do I make sure that I get 
enough shopping money? How do I make sure that we take in the right combination of 
small daily earnings and larger, less frequent, earnings? How do I make sure that I am 
not surprised by sudden high costs? How do I make sure that my husband does not 
spend too much on gambling and drinking? Balancing the household budget involves 
searching for an optimal or correct allocation of financial means over time. To achieve 
that balance, a woman has to deal with the demands of her husband and children, 
with the demands of her neighbors, her own desires as a consumer, and with 
unpredictable circumstances. For wives the basic objective, most of the time, is to 
enlarge their shopping budgets.
Negotiations between husbands and wives follow different paths. A woman can 
argue that she should have more shopping money, either because shopping costs are 
higher than estimated, or because her own income is lower than expected. For most 
men it is very difficult to check whether the financial picture presented by their wives 
is accurate or not, and this provides wives with an opportunity to manipulate the 
truth. Numerous women who have a hard time negotiating over shopping money 
consistently lie about the size of their own income, conceal their savings, and 
exaggerate household expenses. Many men, in turn, suspect that they cannot rely on 
their wives' reports, and therefore they try to restrict their contributions to a minimum 
or, like their wives, they He about their own earnings. In such a situation of mutual 
distrust, wives have only one recourse: they must try to play on their husbands' 
sentiments. They can either act pitifully, by begging and whining, or angrily, by publicly 
denouncing their husbands as failures, unable to support the family. Other women 
choose to look for work if there is not enough money coming from their husbands. 
Many of them engage in home production or accept work as a maid, mainly because 
they want to have pocket money for themselves. Such independent action can have an 
adverse affect, however, since a husband might see that his wife is managing more 
comfortably and conclude that he can now allocate even less to the household and 
keep more for himself.
Women can also acquire supplemental resources by borrowing money. Women are 
generally free to borrow whatever they want in order to fill gaps in the shopping 
budget (although they have limited access to such loans), but they must also depend 
on that same shopping budget to repay these loans. If this becomes an ongoing 
structural problem, it can lead to spiraling debts, so that an increasing proportion of 
the shopping budget must be spent on installments and interest payments. However, 
we should remember that women's, as well as men's, incomes tend to fluctuate, so that 
women can count on eventual, occasional rezeki to escape mounting debts.29 One can 
imagine that accumulating debts might force husbands to make larger contributions to 
the household budget. If that were true, the practice of borrowing money could become
29 Repaying debts with debts is a financial strategy widely practiced in Bujung; in this way, people try to 
balance needs and rezeki over time. A more elaborate discussion can be found in Hotze Lont "When We are 
Broke . . . :  Managing Unbalanced Cycles of Money in Urban Households, Yogyakarta, Indonesia," in 
Money and Culture: Examples from Indonesia, South-Africa and India, ed. Peer Smets, Urban Research 
Working Papers, No. 44 (Amsterdam: Free University, 1999).
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an instrument for women to use in their negotiations with their husbands. My research, 
however, did not turn up evidence that this strategy was being adopted by women.
When it happens that the wife wishes to take out bigger loans of the sort that often 
require collateral held by her husband, loans that cannot be easily repaid with the 
usual shopping budget, she needs the consent of her husband. Such debts will probably 
require that the household dip into its stocked savings, and, as noted above, husband 
and wife jointly control these savings. Thus a husband's inclinations would largely 
determine whether a woman could negotiate a large loan successfully.
Household Management Practices Compared
Though it must be acknowledged that the financial strategies of women in Bujung 
differ from person to person, significant patterns do distinguish the strategies of 
women who live in the upper section of the ward from the strategies of women who 
reside in the lower section. These can be illustrated through the cases of Yani and 
Gunem and their families, who represent typical examples of both social categories.
Yani and Sartono. Yani is the daughter of a civil servant from Bantul. In the 1980s 
she married Sartono who is the son of a civil servant from Madiun. While Sartono 
pursued his education in Yogyakarta, his father bought a small house for Sartono and 
his brother in the upper section of Bujung. After their marriage, Sartono's brother 
moved out, and Yani came to stay with her husband. Now the couple has three 
children, one in junior high school and two in primary school. Sartono works at the 
provincial labor department as an instructor, and he earns Rp450,000 per month.30 
From July to October he can usually make some extra money when there are special 
projects at his workplace, but since the nation's economic crisis, this source of extra 
income has dried up. In the evenings, Sartono works odd jobs for acquaintances who 
hire him to paint their cars or motorcycles. Sartono hopes that after his retirement he 
can open a repair shop for cars. A few years ago Sartono borrowed money from his 
office co-operative so that Yani could open a small shop at their house. The shop was 
not a success, and they eventually abandoned the idea. They subsequently borrowed 
again from Yani's sister and from another source (probably a moneylender), this time 
for funds to purchase supplies so that they could make snacks and sell them at the 
market. Each time Sartono receives his wage, he brings it to the bank, and whenever the 
shopping money of his wife is depleted, they withdraw money from their bank 
account. Lately, the bank account has often been empty, and they have chosen to take 
out interim loans from the office co-operative or from the bank, where Sartono is 
qualified to borrow without putting up collateral. However, they must take care 
because the installment payments for such loans are automatically deducted from 
Sartono's wages, so that Sartono's monthly income has dwindled. The loans taken out 
by Sartono and Yani are relatively large. The couple makes decisions concerning their 
household loans and debts jointly.
Not all the women residents of the upper section of the ward are in a position like 
Yani's. Many participate in more simpan pinjam and manage their working capital
30 In July 1999, the date on which these amounts were established, the exchange rate was roughly Rp6,000 
against one US dollar.
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independently. Other women have no idea how much their husbands earn and simply 
take whatever shopping money they are offered. Wanti, the wife of a civil servant, 
says:
In the households in this neighborhood it is the wife who knows what is going on 
with the money. When there is a need for money, it is the wife who looks for a 
loan. Today I took out a loan, and I am certainly not going to tell my husband 
because he will be angry with me. I am forced to borrow because the money he 
gives me is not enough. He says: "Here is the money, it is up to you." I just have 
to manage with what he gives. On the other hand, he also has secrets from me. I 
saw on his payroll that he himself took a loan from the office. I asked him what it 
was for, and he answered that it was for some necessity. Well, what can I do 
about that!?
Nevertheless, women like Wanti remain an exception in the upper-class section.
Gunem and Slamet. Gunem is the daughter of a landless peasant from Gunung 
Kidul. Her husband, Slamet, was bom in Gunung Kidul as well. He came to 
Yogyakarta to work as a pedicab driver, but he gradually became a construction 
worker who specialized in digging wells. Now they live in the lower section of Bujung 
with three of their four children, the husband of their oldest daughter, and a 
grandchild. Slamet can only dig wells in the dry season, but when he has a job, Slamet 
can make Rpl00,000 in three days. In construction, he can earn Rpl0,000 per day. The 
wage is respectable, but the work is irregular; he can be without a job for many days. 
Gunem herself has found a job as a housemaid for a Chinese family; she receives a 
basic income of Rpl20,000 per month. She occasionally receives extra money for odd 
jobs, and her employers pay special bonuses for the religious holidays. The couple's 
two oldest children have already found paid work, but they spend their earnings as 
they please and only contribute to the household budget whenever there is a shortfall. 
Slamet and Gunem regularly borrow money from a variety of sources, including 
moneylenders, simpan pinjam, neighbors, Gunem's boss and colleagues, and the 
pawnshop. Usually they must resort to such loans because Slamet has failed to find 
work, or because unexpected costs, such as school fees or expenses for their daughter's 
wedding, have cropped up. But even payments for daily food often exceed Gunem's 
fund of shopping money. Gunem herself says that she cannot always rely on her 
husband.
Slamet often does not have a job, and when he does have a job he just gives me 
so and so much money. That is not enough to take care of the family, and 
therefore I went to work. Almost all the women in this part of the neighborhood 
work because they cannot manage with what their husbands give them. If I can, I 
try to keep some money apart. If Slamet has a good job I can bring some money 
to the bank, or I buy some gold. Each month I save money with my boss, so that 
not all that I earn is spent on food. Slamet does not know. He thinks I only earn 
Rp75,000.
Even though she has some savings put away, Gunem prefers to borrow money when 
she is out of shopping money. "I want to keep these savings as long as possible."
In the lower section of Bujung, not every woman finds herself in Gunem's situation, 
of course. Some women never borrow and always discuss financial problems openly
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with their husbands. Other women trust their husbands even less than Gunem does 
and are forced to keep secret savings. There is the case of Giyem, wife of an often- 
unemployed electrician, for example. Before the economic crisis, Giyem used to have 
three different places to save money, one box for shopping money, one for business 
capital, and one where she put away money to pay for the circumcision of her son. She 
kept these last two boxes hidden, and her husband did not even know that the third 
existed. Eventually when the son needed to be circumcised, her husband came to 
Giyem to discuss the problem: "Maybe we should borrow some money." Then she 
presented the box to him, saying: "See, I have saved some money." Giyem explained:
I kept it a secret because otherwise it may happen that he wants to buy 
cigarettes, and he does not have the money. He might easily take from that 
savings box. Or he is alone and wants to watch TV. He asks me whether I have 
any money to buy cigarettes. I say: No, there is no money, you will have to do 
without. Of course he could be very angry when it turns out that there has been 
money all the time, but he will not. He has been lied to, but it was a good lie. In 
the end he is also happy that we do not have to borrow.
Another woman called Tatik told me that she did not have a secret box, but "if I had a 
husband who liked to gamble and hang around [as Giyem's husband does], I would 
probably have a secret box too."
When it comes to access to credit, certain differences between people residing in 
the upper and the lower sections of the ward play crucial roles. People in the upper 
section of Bujung generally have higher and more stable incomes than those in the lower 
section. Because people living in the upper section are more likely to own their own 
houses and land, they tend to be more eligible for bank loans. What's more, securing 
those loans is a relatively simple process, since their job contracts often function as 
collateral. But the risk of losing their assets scares many people away from this option.
Though we note that people of this higher class generally have an easier time 
securing loans, it is also true that women living in the upper section have less access to 
credit than do women living in the lower section, since poorer women enjoy greater 
access to roving moneylenders and neighbors. Daily interaction between neighbors is a 
lot less frequent in the upper section of the ward, and inhabitants are generally less 
concerned and knowledgeable about each other's financial affairs. Because of this, 
loans from neighbors are rarely sought or offered. Moneylenders are also a 
comparatively rare sight in the upper section, and because so few people in this area 
resort to moneylenders, those who do are more likely to attract scorn from their 
neighbors. Of course, inhabitants of the upper section have less need for such loans, 
since they are more financially secure in many ways; most of them have health 
insurance, for instance, and some are enrolled in education savings plans. Furthermore, 
inhabitants of the upper section can rely more confidently on support from their 
relatives. This is the case not only because wealthier people tend to have wealthier 
relatives, but because the borrowers' basic income makes them more likely to repay the 
debt and reciprocate the loan at some time in the future. Families in the upper section 
enjoy more financial security than the poor, as we would expect. (This does not mean 
they often accumulate surplus income, since their higher expenditures for luxury items, 
education, and travel usually consume any surplus.) But again, because the sources of 
credit generally available to, and tolerated by, such families are more likely to be
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connected to the office than to the street, these comparatively affluent women 
themselves have rather limited access to credit.31
Women living in the upper section earn substantially less than their husbands do. 
They generally engage in trading, sewing, and sometimes in home production, while 
their husbands earn a salary at the office. Their income is considered to be a small but 
welcome addition to the basic income earned by their husbands. And yet these women, 
who do not earn a large proportion of the household income, seem to exercise 
considerable control over the household budget, not only with respect to the shopping 
money but also to the stocked savings. They seldom venture out to borrow money, 
because their husbands have better sources of credit at their disposal, but they 
certainly do influence the way that money is spent.
In comparison, the women residents of the lower-class section often earn nearly as 
much as, if not more than, their husbands do. Their stable incomes as maids and 
laundry women form the basis for the household budget, while the unreliable incomes 
that their husbands earn as pedicab drivers or construction workers figure as welcome 
additions to the household funds. Yet although most of these women earn a relatively 
large part of the household income—in some cases more than half—they exercise 
comparatively less control over the money earned by their husbands than is true for the 
more affluent women. Their husbands seem to think that since these wives earn money, 
they can take care of themselves. What's more, because incomes in this part of the 
neighborhood tend to be lower and more unreliable, husbands struggle more fiercely for 
their share of the money. Poorer wives engage in more frequent and more intense open 
conflicts about money with their husbands. And when it becomes necessary to take out 
a loan, it is usually these women who venture to find a lender, since like wealthier 
women they are anchored to the home, but, unlike them, they have ready access to 
sources of credit—moneylenders, neighbors—easily reached from the home. Do these 
conditions show the women to be powerful or powerless, autonomous or dependent? I 
would argue that potential answers to these questions are not so neatly opposed as 
many have assumed. Female "self-reliance" and economic insecurity appear to be 
closely interlinked.
Conclusion
The social and cultural factors which social anthropologists have cited to explain 
the strong position of Southeast Asian women in the household are certainly at work in 
Bujung. Women of the upper and lower classes control the shopping budget, while 
stocked savings are managed by husband and wife together. However, financial 
autonomy is not only a matter of having the right to decide how money will be spent. 
Autonomy will vary depending on the amount of money available to be spent. The 
relative sizes of both budgets, and thus the financial autonomy of the respective wives, 
are determined in each case by how much the husband is willing to contribute. If the 
husband is willing to contribute a great deal, then the wife has sufficient financial
31 Regarding consumption, it is clear that women in both categories spend considerably less on personal 
consumption than their husbands do. Men living in the lower section spend considerable amounts of money 
on drinking, gambling, and smoking. Men living in the upper-class section are more likely to make purchases 
that contribute to the entire household, but these will be luxury purchases, like televisions sets, or even 
additions to the house.
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space to determine how much money she wants to set aside for shopping and how 
much she wants to save. If the husband is not willing, or simply unable, to contribute 
enough, then the wife faces financial problems. Men ultimately decide on the actual 
size of the shopping budget by rationing their contributions.
To be more clear, female financial autonomy does not mean that a woman can 
spend money for herself. In Java, women are strongly influenced by social norms that 
expect them to consider the needs of other household members first, before thinking 
about their own. Wives are less comparatively concerned with their own consumer 
needs. My research showed that they were primarily concerned with providing food 
for their families, avoiding embarrassing scenes with screaming children, and 
complying with reciprocal payments to neighbors, friends, and relatives. Their financial 
autonomy lies in their ability to make these expenditures according to their own wishes 
and insights.
Husbands (and children) are not interested at all in the financial matters of the 
household. They just want to make sure that there is enough money to fulfill their 
personal needs, to buy cigarettes, to go gambling, and to buy the things they want to 
buy. Husbands generally do not contest their wives' authority over the shopping 
budget; rather, it is the size of the shopping budget that is subject to discussion. The 
fact that these different members of the household have different objectives often leads 
to domestic conflicts concerning money. The less money there is available, the fiercer 
the struggle. Women have limited ability to negotiate, especially because they depend 
in part on the income of their husbands.
The incident involving Parman and his wife, described at the beginning of this 
essay, shows how little control many wives from the lower section of Bujung have over 
the size of their shopping budgets. They are forced to accept that their husbands may 
bring home something one day and nothing the next. After he makes some money, 
Parman thinks first about himself and then about his family. Partly as a consequence 
of her husband's habits, his wife finds it hard to fulfill the "household needs," let 
alone to satisfy her own desires for consumer goods. Given the situation, her only 
recourse is to shame him in front of a guest. This makes Parman feel, at least, a bit 
uneasy, but I am afraid that it has not kept him from doing the same thing again.
At last, financial autonomy appears to be related most strongly to the total 
household income and not so much, as is often suggested, to the relative contribution 
of the wife. Despite the fact that women living in the lower section of the ward make 
relatively larger contributions to the household and have greater access to credit, these 
comparatively poor women enjoy less financial autonomy than do women in the upper 
section. The latter can exercise a similar form of control, but they control a larger 
(shopping) budget, which means they have more financial autonomy. In other words, I 
conclude that when women come to earn a relatively smaller part of an expanding 
household income, this may in fact increase their financial autonomy.
These observations also suggest that access to credit does not substantially 
contribute to female financial autonomy. If a woman uses loans to supplement her 
shopping budget, which is most often the case in Bujung, this means little for her 
financial autonomy because eventually she also has to break into that same budget to 
repay the loan. At best, the loan allows her the ability to manage her shopping money
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in a more flexible way. Contrary to the hopes and suggestions of many microfinance 
institutions, women rarely use loans to invest in business. Even if they did, it would 
contribute little to their financial autonomy. An expansion of her enterprise would 
increase a woman's workload, and it might very well cause her husband to ration his 
contribution to the household even more strictly, especially in low-income households 
where money is scarce.
